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THESIS 
 
 Just as painting by the numbers does not make one an artist, following 
rules and procedures of democractic governance, even if faithfully carried out, 
does not make a citizenry democratic in character.  This is because the idea of 
democracy "involves much more than political organization and economic 
opportunity, important as these are."1  What more is involved?  Inspired by John 
Dewey's and others' moral and spiritual visions of democracy,2 I shall argue in 
this essay that democracy requires development of an essential moral 
characteristic, namely, intersubjectivity.  To this end, I will enquire first into the 
meaning of intersubjectivity and then into the method of its cultivation.  
 
DEMOCRACY AS PRACTICE OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
     
 Democracy literally means people (demos) having power (kratos), the 
power of self-determination and self-government.  Taking a cue from this 
original meaning of democracy, we may posit that central to democracy is the 
idea of people governing themselves rather than being governed by an external 
authority, be it God, Monarch, or Corporation.  Seeing how the latter 
arrangement has dominated human history, and also even today how democracy 
struggles everywhere to manfest itself properly, I suggest that we should not 
assume an easy understanding of this notion of mutual governance.  On the 
contrary, we need to inquire closely into just how such an arrangement works.  
What does it require of people for them to be able to govern themselves 
mutually?  Or, to put it another way, what kind of people do we have to become 
to be able to practice mutual governance?  What abilities and dispositions, what 
virtues and values, do we have to embody to become democractic citizens?  The 
questions I raise here go to the heart of the inquiry concerning the nature of 
power peculiar to democratic governance.  Power is the ability or capacity to 
accomplish a given work, in this case, mutual governance.  But unlike in the 
physical understanding of power, in our social understanding of power, we have 
to talk about different conceptions of power.  For instance, autocratic domination 
as one conception of power, so prevalent in human history, obviously does not 
go with mutual governance.  For mutual governance, we cannot have an 
autocratic power that an individual unit, be it a person or a corporate body, 
possesses and exercises over others.  What is the conception of power that 
coheres with mutual governance of democracy?  For reasons obvious, the kind of 
power that makes mutual governance possible is, precisely, one that emerges 
from the relationality of a mutually functioning body of people.  Here, power 
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does not lie in the individual beings but in their mutual interaction; hence 
democratic power is found in the relationships themselves.    
 But we need to be careful here in our understanding of relationships.  We 
may have a group without the kind of relationaships that will have the capacity 
for mutual governance.  Think of 200 individual students in a lecture hall who 
don't know each other and have no interaction: they are not a democratic body.  
They don't govern themselves mutually.  A collection of essentially isolated 
individuals who have little to do with each other and pursue their own separate 
good cannot have a democracy.  Or, even if these 200 individuals act in unison to 
the command of the instructor, as when a final examination is administered, they 
are not engaged in a self-governance.  They obey the command.  It is only when 
people in the group interact with each other in mutual inquiry, consultation, and 
deliberation with the aim of arriving at a common good that we have democracy.  
The power of democracy lies precisely in the collective wisdom that emerges from 
mutual inquiry, consultation, and deliberation.  When ordinary people put their 
"heads" and "hearts" together, an extraordinary measure of wisdom emerges.3  
Sounds easy?  Its enaction is difficult, for, there are entrenched obstacles, as 
witnessed over and over again in history and current affairs.   
 The foremost obstacle is the contempt for ordinary folk.  Many of us 
believe in the naturalness of the domination model of governance, arguing that 
the extraordinary people, few in number, with their superiority in one form or 
another naturally come to govern the many who are ordinary.  In this 
explanation, what is overlooked is the possibility of a vicious circle involving 
systemic disempowerment.  Through systemic practices of disempowerment 
(both symbolic and physical) over ordinary folk, the many can be made so 
degraded and disabled that they accept the domination and exploitation from the 
controlling few.  Against this argument of injustice, some might contend that, all 
the same, there has to be an initial unequal distribution of capacities, making a 
small number of individuals superior over a vast majority of inferior folk.  In 
response, I shall argue that superiority and inferiority are not "natural," pre-
given categories: they are "after-the-fact" social constructs, offered typically to 
justify the existing membership of the privileged.  What this means is that there 
is no necessity for us to accept the subtantive definition of superiority in terms of 
domination and exploitation.  Moreover, on moral grounds, we must in fact 
reject and condemn such a definition.  Not only that, we should propose that 
domination and exploitation are not attributes of superiority but of inferiority, on 
the moral plane .  We shall regard those who perpetuate domination and 
exploitation with contempt, even when they physically control us.       
 Democracy is a moral vision of life that condemns domination and 
promotes mutual governance, seeing the latter as a better way to live.   
Concommitantly, it is a fighting creed that insists that ordinary people be given 
the opportunity to prove in practice the possibility of mutual governance.  The 
fundamental conviction behind democracy is that when ordinary people are not 
reduced and disabled,4 they are capable of governing themselves mutually and 
cooperatively by the power of good will and collective wisdom.  Democracy is a 
faith in the power of the collectivity of ordinary folk.  But the key here is that 
ordinary folk must not be reduced and disabled, a condition that is increasingly 
hard to fulfil.    
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 Now, let us inquire into what exactly the democractic process of mutual 
inquiry, consultation, and deliberation entails.  The reason why I propose this 
inquiry is to dispel the erroneous notion, pervasive nowadays, that the 
democratic process is essentially a bargaining process.  In bargaining, individuals 
come together to cut the best deals for themselves.  Whoever walks away from 
the bargaining table with most of his or her interests and demands fulfilled is the 
winner.  The game they play is maximise the gain and minimize the loss with 
respect to self-interest.  But how could this be democracy?  Where in this is 
manifest the essence of democracy, namely, the faith in the emergence of 
collective wisdom (the common good) and the committment to the process of 
mutual inquiry, consultation, and deliberation (the good will to the common 
good)?  This essence of democracy is simply missing from the practice of 
bargaining.  Bargaining is what individuals do; it is not what a citizenry does.  
Nothing can be further from the democratic spirit and practice than the 
egocentric game of maximizing self-gain and minimizing self-loss.  
 But how is the democratic spirit of good will and common good to be 
generated?  Such spirit cannot either be assumed to pre-exist, that is, be inherent, 
in individuals, nor be imposed from without.  If it is inherent in the individual, 
then democracy would be an inevitability, not a labour we have to engage in.  
Plainly such is not the case.  On the other hand, if it has to be imposed from 
without, then by definition, there will be no democracy.  Therefore, the most 
reasonable conclusion is that it has to be cultivated, most likely under the 
stringent conditions of care and toil.  Where do we start?  What may be the 
foundation of this cultivation?  As the phrase, "common good," indicates, 
common good is a good common to all members of the community.5  As such, 
we cannot find out what it is until we actually come together and undertake the 
process of inquiry, consultation, and deliberation.  The common good is 
something we arrive at, something that emerges, and is not a given.  This is most 
visibly the case for a pluralistic society like ours where we just cannot assume 
that we all share a common good which is already figured out, handed down or 
is inherent in each and every one of us.  To arrive at a common good, people 
have to come together in the first place, united in the conviction that this way of 
life is better than others.  In other words, people have to have the will to the 
common good ("good will").  Unless there is this good will, there will be no 
impetus or cause to come together and work out the common good.  But, again, 
is good will something to be assumed to pre-exist?  If what I see around me is an 
indication, I don't think we can assume this at all.  The good will, too, has to be 
cultivated.  How?   
 Good will is a function of how much we care about each other, which, in 
turn, is a function of our relatedness to each other.6  You have a good will 
towards those whom you care about deeply.  Relatedness, however, comes from 
sharing our lives and feeling the human bond or solidarity as a result.  Sharing of 
thoughts, perceptions, hopes, fears, desires, as well as the actual sweat of 
communal labour, is what makes us feel bonded to each other and makes us 
committed to promoting each other's well-being.  Thus, the meaning of, or the 
reasons for, mutual inquiry, consultation, and deliberation is that we share 
ourselves, in words and in deeds.  Dialogue wherein we share our minds and 
hearts, therefore, is the most foundational activity of democracy.  Understanding 
that emerges from dialogue is the foundation of sympathy and solidarity.  
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Understanding bridges differences and draws people together.  Such 
understanding is the source of the power that fuels demoncracy.   
 Let us now probe a little deeper and ask just how the power of shared 
understanding works.  What I want to show here is that the nature of power 
inherent in understanding is such that it does not support domination but 
solidarity.  This is a crucially important point because, as indicated earlier, many 
of us equate power with domination (and exploitation) and base the latter on 
knowledge.  Recall Francis Bacon's famous (or rather, infamous) dictum that 
knowledge is power.7  But not all knowledges are created equal and do the same 
thing.  Understanding that emerges from the practices of good will and 
achievement of mutual sharing is not at all the same as domination-oriented 
knowledge.  Understanding as a fruit of mutual sharing has altogether a 
different nature.  This is because understanding is born of sympathethic joys and 
sorrows experienced when people share their subjectivity, that is, their thoughts, 
feelings, perceptions, desires, and so on.8  It is not that we become alike each 
other.  We are irrevocably unique individuals and cannot be reduced to 
sameness.  Any attempt to reduce people to sameness alwasy brings distress and 
suffering.  The most and the best we can do is to hypothetically entertain each 
other's perspectives and experiences.  Through such exercise, regularly repeated, 
the scope of our perspective enlarges and we become in disposition less 
dogmatic and self-righteous.  We become more open-minded and 
understanding, that is, able to entertain an other's experiences and views as if our 
own.  "As-ifness" or subjunctivity here is an important moral disposition in that it 
enable us to stretch understanding and become more receptive and responsive to 
each other.     
 At this point, I would like to finally introduce the term, 'intersubjectivity', 
to name the above process of mutual sharing of thoughts, perceptions, values, in 
short, the content of consciousness.  Subjectivity, as I define it, refers to the fact of 
having the "inner," psychological world of thoughts, feelings, values, and 
attitudes, as opposed to the "outer" world of physiological processes of the body 
and matter in motion.  When subjectivity is shared, so that there is a transfusion 
of thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and desires taking place, this is 
intersubjectivity.  We become intersubjective beings when, through sharing 
ourselves, we are open to each other's subjectivity and allow its transfusion 
across our individual differences.  Democracy, in the way I have been theorizing, 
is fundamentally this practise of intersubjectivity.  We become democratic in 
spirit and character when we are able to open up to each other's subjectivity and 
share our thoughts, perceptions, emotions respectfully in a subject-to-subject 
relationship.   
   
 
OBSTACLES TO INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
 
 Things have their affording as well as limiting conditions.  The practice of 
intersubjectivity is no exception.  In this section, I wish to probe into the 
conditions for intersubjectivity.  This is an indispensible discussion because in 
education we are concerned with actual implementation and practice.  As in 
planting, seeds have to be given the right conditions to germinate: good soil, 
sunlight, warmth, and moisture.  Likewise for cultivating intersubjectivity.  If we 
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try to practice intersubjectivity under an inimical condition, our efforts will be 
frustrated.  The practice of intersubjectivity, which is difficult at any time, faces 
an especial challenge in our times.  Our times are said to be dominated by 
instrumentalism: the tendency to view the world merely as objects.  I shall argue 
that instrumentalism makes intersubjectivity difficult, if not impossible.  Unless 
we overcome instrumentalism, it will be difficult to truly practise democracy and 
become democratic.     
 When the self sees itself as the subject and the world as the object, it treats 
the latter instrumentally, as merely a resource and tool for itself.  The self that 
sees the world as an object is an alienated self.  The absolute, categorical 
dichotomy between the subject and the object leaves the subject little room for a 
warm and receptive feeling of consanguity, of friendship and solidarity, towards 
the world.  Friendship makes us care about each other intrinsically, not 
instrumentally.  Alienation, however, makes us relate to the world only 
instrumentally: to exploit and consume the other.  Exploitation and 
consumption: this is the nature of the game played in a consumeristic society.  
Predation becomes the basic ethos of such society.  'Predation' is a strong word, 
for sure, evoking visceral reactions.  But the word captures, in my opinion, 
perfectly well the social logic of instrumentalism.  The advantaged promote 
themselves by preying upon and exploiting the disadvantaged.  Here, we don't 
even have to attribute personal nastiness to people who participate in a 
fundamentally exploitive system.  Think of students in schools.  The reason why 
Johnny gets A and eventually becomes socially rewarded is because there are for 
every Johnny ten "losers" who get Cs, Ds, and Fs.  Johnny is  a good kid and 
means no harm to others.  He goes about doing a diligent job of learning, for 
which he is amply rewarded.  But the school system is set up so that if Johnny 
gets A, someone else is not getting an A.  The school is, I am afraid, a social 
"jungle" heavy with the scent of competition.9  The inhabitants sense instinctively 
the unsafety of the environment, and many are understandably fearful and 
careful.     
 In many of the undergraduate classes I teach, I have repeatedly noticed 
that the majority of students feel awkward and reluctant to open themselves up 
to their peers.  They do not feel free, comfortable, or even "safe" to express their 
thoughts and perceptions, let alone to submit themselves to their fellow 
participants for critical responses.  The public space of the classroom that they 
have entered does not feel safe to them.  Being open is a function of the 
perception of safety.  When we perceive that things are not safe to us, we shut 
down automatically, ready to flee or fight.  Why is the public space perceived as 
not safe?  What dangers lurk here?  The danger we are dealing with here is 
primarily of the psychological nature.  The psychological danger is prior to the 
physical danger in that the former precedes the latter.  We don't intentionally 
hurt others physically without there being first the negative, hostile perception of 
the other.  Such perception can take any degree of intensity, from lack of 
recognition of the other10 to murderous intent upon the other.  The intensity or 
degree aside, the basic attitude is the same: lack of fundamental respect for the 
other as a subject, a person, worthy of being valued intrinsically.11  When this 
moral respect is lacking in a relationship, possibilities of harm and damage, 
including physical harm, exist. 
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   The public space is dangerous to us insofar as there is a danger of our 
being received by others instrumentally, that is, without fundamental moral 
respect.  We are familiar with such danger: the public space as a predatory 
"jungle" wherein people compete to rise above each other.  They seek advantages 
over each other.  The name of the game we are supposed to play is Survival of 
the Strongest.  To that end, we put down others: we dismiss them or actively 
reduce them.  No one is spared of the merciless process of tearing down.  One 
way of defining privilege is the measure of protection from this process of 
predation.  The privileged can put enough distance between themselves and the 
destructive reality so as not to get affected.  Not only that, the highly privileged 
can actively and directly participate in the predation with impunity.   The way 
that the disprivileged cope with the situation of unequal power is by being 
constantly on guard so as not to appear incapable, incompetant, unendowed, 
unmerited, undesirable, and so on.  (Of course, privilege is a phenomenon of 
relative degrees and operates in the manner of "food chain.")  Those with the 
weakest self-perception hide themselves in silence and invisibility.  Better to be 
unseen than be seen incompetant.  I see my students in class enacting this logic.  
Their silence pains me.  I read in their eyes both the desire to be recognized ("I 
am here; please see me") and the desire to hide ("Please don't make me say things 
in front of everyone").  How shall we change the ethos of the public space so that 
we renounce the egocentric game of survival and practice intersubjectivity?  
 One approach widely advocated and practised has become a modern 
dogma: self-esteem building.  The basic practice behind self-esteem building is 
that, on balance, we should not weaken or damage another's self-image.  If 
criticisms are called for at all, they are to be "sandwiched" between praises.  As 
well, criticisms are to be constructive, and so on.  These are good advice, and 
observing them will make life more pleasant.  But there are inherent problems 
with the very notion of self-esteem in that self-esteem is dependent upon an 
evaluation according to certain value criteria.  For example, if my self-esteem 
depends on my making lots of money, likely I will suffer from a fluctuating self-
esteem.  My self-esteem may parallel the stockmarket index!  Or, as a teenager, if 
my self-esteem depends on my having high grades, becoming popular, getting a 
boyfriend, wearing fashionable designers' clothes, and so on,  I am in for a never-
ending frustration and despair, however mild.  Given that, in general, more 
people lose than win in the competitve game of acquisition, be they material 
goods or non-material goods, most people's self-esteem will suffer.  Trying to 
boost self-esteem becomes a Sisyphean project.    
 Another approach is privitization of the public space.  If the public space 
is problematic, so goes the reasoning, then make it like a private space.  This is a 
doable proposition, for example, with a classroom that is small and personal and 
is managed by a caring teacher.  We can readily conjure up the image of a 
kindergarden classroom.  It has been suggested that teachers can furnish a 
classroom like a living room with couches, lamps, plants, and so on.  While I am 
all for making the classroom a pleasant, livable place, I argue that by assimilating 
the public space to a private space, we lose the sense of the public.  The public 
space is not, and should not be made to be, one's living room or bedroom where 
one can do and say whatever one wants.  The public is a space of contending, 
conflicting values and practices, personal visions and tastes.  It is a space where 
Otherness is keenly experienced.  Therein lie the important challenges and 
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virtues of the public space.  Privatization of the public space is an attempt to 
colonize and obliterate Otherness.  If we succeed in this, we lose the opportunity 
to practice intersubjectivity.  For, without the Other, there is no intersubjectivity: 
only subjectivity.  Intersubjectivity is seeing the Other as a subject, not 
obliterating the Other.  When I encounter a being so different from myself and 
am keenly aware of its Otherness, I am given an opportunity, a challenge, truely 
a gift, to practice intersubjectivity.  Should I succeed in seeing the other as a 
subject, despite its alterity, my pratice of intersubjectivity has been fruitful.  The 
challenge of the public space is precisely this challenge to practice civic virtues of 
fundamental respect for and openness to the Otherness of the other.  This 
comment brings me back to the talk of self-esteem above. 
 What we are called to practice in public is not self-esteem building but 
respect-giving.  Esteem is a conditional thing, subject to evaluation, therefore 
contingent.  For instance, I cannot hold a morally depraved person in good 
esteem.  However, as a person committed to an ethical ideal of intersubjectivity, I 
must repect him as a subject, not dismissing him as useless and worthless when 
he does not serve my interest or meets my expectation, or seeing her as useful 
and valuable when she meets my expectation.  To hold another being in 
fundamental (moral) respect is not to perceive and treat it only instrumentally 
but, foremostly, to consider its own well-being.  Being considerate here does not 
necessarily mean that we can actually play an active role of helping.  The other 
for whatever reasons may refuse the help and guidance we can give.  Or, we may 
not know how best to help the other.  But, at the least, we do not cease to be 
considerate of others and do not relax our moral posture of attending and 
listening.  These may sound easy and don't seem like any work on our part.  This 
is not so.  We have been conditioned, some of us more acutely than others, to be 
"social-jungle" animals, insecure and fearful, greedy with an eye on the other as a 
potential danger or a potential gain.  Instrumentalism has become the thick blood 
that courses through our veins.  Our practice of intersubjectivity, wherein we 
embrace the Otherness of the other and give it fundamental moral respect, is 
challenging work, requiring tremendous self-discipline and effort-making in 
resistence against our conditioning.  Coming back to my earlier pitch about the 
practice of intersubjectivity requiring the Otherness and the public space, I 
would like to elaborate this point further, arguing that the participation in the 
public, which is the essence of democracy, is the way to overcome our egocentric 
habits of mind that block intersubjectivity.                    
 
  
CULTIVATING INTERSUBJECTIVITY  
 
 To one so worried about his or her survival, any being that he or she 
encounters poses a potential danger.  Preoccupation with her survival and self-
interest makes her an easy target for deep insecurity and vulnerability.  There is 
no end, no "enough," to this game of self-survival.  At first, survival might mean 
making 30,000 dollars; soon, it becomes making 60,000 dollars with two cars; 
later, it may become 100,000 dollars with a yacht and a vacation to Mexico.  This 
is just one scenario: other scenarios, of which there are an infinite variations, may 
involve accumulating different kinds of merit, be it promotion on the 
institutional ladder or securing the favours of the people one has to live or work 
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with.  All the same, as long as one is compelled by the necessity of proving one's 
comparative worth, the hostile and greedy game of egocentric survival 
continues.  When fear and anxiety collectively generated by the insecure and 
vulnerable participants permeate the public space, it is felt as a unsafe space.  No 
amount of boosting of self-esteem and other ego-stengthening measures will 
make the space feel safer.  As long as there is the fear and anxiety over self-
protection and self-promotion, as long as people play the Survival Game, the 
public space will remain hostile, unsafe.   
 True, people may talk incessantly about how to make the learning 
environment safe and how we should be respectful of our differences, and so on.  
But no amount of talk fundamentally changes anything.  In fact, the more people 
talk about their anxieties and fear of the unsafe public space, the more they 
entrench the perception and enact it.  What needs to be done is to get to the root 
of the problem which is the alienated sense of self, the ego-self, that gets 
distressed by the Otherness of the other.  Therefore, we need to learn to embrace 
otherness.  But, as in a physical embrace, one cannot embrace the other when one 
is all tensed up and rigid, ready for fight or flight.  One has to relax, let go of the 
tension caused by anxieties and fear.  But typically, psychological problems are 
not "solved" in any fundamental way by logical reasoning and pursuasive talk.  
Telling ourselves not to fear and be anxious  doesn't really help.  We  need to go 
below the discursive layer, down to the elements of psyche to work directly with 
them.  Here one such suggestion I shall make is what we may term "attentional 
work."12  The basic idea behind this work is that when one pays a full and deep 
attention to something, one forgets one's fears and anxities.  This is actually a 
well-known phenomenon, especially well known to performers and artists.  
Tension from anxieties and fear in the egocentric mode vanishes when the work 
of attention takes over.  For, when one focuses one's attention so deeply and 
completely on the other, there is no room for egocentric murmurs and tremors.  
Call it a self-transcendence, "not-self," decentering, engrossment, motivational 
displacement, or by any other name known in various fields of scholarship.13  To 
me, they all point to basically the same psychological phenomenon.  The 
phenomenon describes a fundamental shift in the axes of the psyche, from 
egocentricism and subjectivity to intersubjectivity wherein a subject-to-subject, 
not subject-to-object, relationship emerges.   
 The attentional work we spoke of above is not a certain kind of activity.  It 
is a mode of activity.  Anywhere where there is the other, one can engage in 
directing full attention.  However, for our work in democratic citizenship, 
dialogue in public space is a particularly good opportunity to practice attention.  
Settings of familiarity and intimacy typically do not inspire a disciplined 
approach to the cultivation of attention-giving, and it is the disciplined approach 
we need for a serious cultivation.  One needs the discipline of paying sustained 
and impartial attention to the other.  With respect to a familiar or intimate other, 
we have the tendency to gloss over them: to be quick and efficient with them.  
We tend to interrupt, dismiss, overwhelm, or evade them.  Incivility often mars 
our intimate relationships.  Or else, with our intimates, we are already so 
identified with them or invested in them that we take their presence for granted.  
We love them so much that they have become part of the self.  Otheness of the 
other has vanished.  What is not there demands no attention from us.   If I love 
someone like my own self, then what need is there for me to practice the virtue of 
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patient and unselfish listening?  Indeed, an "enemy" or "alien" would make a far 
better partner for my cultivation of attention!  The public space, fortunately, is 
full of "aliens" and even "enemies," beings whom we find different, strange, 
incomprehensible, crazy, even offensive.  This is a right place for cultivating 
patient, impartial, and good-willed attention.  It challenges us greatly, and when 
we rise to the challenge, we grow richly in our capacity for intersubjectivity.       
 Public school classrooms are a perfect site for our attentional work.  Yet its 
great potential is typically not fulfilled because we tend to see the public as but a 
stage for egocentric plays.  We look upon the public as a resource base, where we 
compete to maximally gain the goodies with which to enrich and fulfil oneself.  
In this vein, the school has become a service institution, and schooling, a service 
industry: it caters to the "clients."  Why should we expect the practice of virtues 
associated with intersubjectivity from the "clients"?  Clients demand efficient 
services and abundant goods for their payment.  How different this 
understanding of the public is from that of the practice of attentional work 
whereby the self learns to overcome its self-centredness and objectivization of the 
other.  The practice of intersubjectivity, of seeing others as subjects, is really a 
practice of overcoming the self-centered way, the habits of prioritizing and 
privileging the self over the other.  This practice is the work of attention, which is 
both the promise and fruit of democracy. 
 I shall end my essay with a quote from John Ralston Saul whose 
"definition" of democracy captures, in his usual sharp style of wit and wisdom, 
some of the essential points I tried to make in this essay: 
 
DEMOCRACY  An existential system in which words are more important 
than actions.  Not a judgemental system.   
 Democracy is not intended to be efficient, linear, logical, cheap, the 
source of absolute truth, manned by angels, saints or virgins, profitable, 
the justification for any particular economic system, a simply matter of 
majority rule or for that matter a simply matter of majorities.  Nor is it an 
administrative procedure, patriotic, a reflection of tribalism, a passive 
servant of either law or regulation, elegant or particularly charming. 
 Democracy is the only system capable of reflecting the humanist 
premise of equilibrium or BALANCE.  The key to its secret is the 
involvement of the citizen.14  
 
                                                 
1 Steven C. Rockefeller, "John Dewey, Spiritual Democracy, and the Human 
Future," in Revisioning Philosophy, ed. James Ogilvy (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1992), 167. 
2 See John Dewey, The Ethics of Democracy, in Early Works of John Dewey (1882 - 
1898), ed. JoAnn Boydston (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1969, 1888).  Also, Steven Rockefeller, John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic 
Humanism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991) 
3 My critic might ask: Who are these ordinary people?  Do they include people 
who are already disabled and disempowered in good measure?  And, when 
these disempowered folk come together, will there emerge a collective wisdom?  
This is a difficult and painful question.  We need to talk about collective healing 
through democracy.  It is wisdom enough that the wounded retreat to the cave 
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and nurse each other back to health.  We may have to extend the meaning of 
democratic governing to include such democratic healing.     
4 The force of disabling is not found just in the aggression committed by 
conquerors.  It is also found in the "progressive" social measures that we identify 
with modernity, namely, professionalization of most human social functions, 
such as teaching, healing, and craftmanship, that ordinary people practised as a 
matter of basic living in traditional societies.  My mother from a peasant 
background delivered babies by her own hand, saved many lives with her folk 
knowledge of healing, and  made a life without the kinds of professional help 
that we nowadays take for granted and cannot have enough of.  We are disabled 
to the extent that we cannot look after ourselves and each other in the way of 
basic life functions.               
5 How inclusive is our democratic community?  Who is included or who is 
excluded in the community?  If our community does not include all whose lives 
are connected to ours in some manner or another, even non-humans and the 
distant others whose faces we will never encounter, then can it be a true 
democratic community?  These are difficult but important questions to ask and 
to respond to.     
6 This understanding, that our relatedness is the foundation of caring, which in 
turn is the ethical basis of good will, is central to the ethic of care or relational 
ethics.  I refer the interested readers to the works by Nel Noddings and Peta 
Bowden.  Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral 
Education (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California, 1984).  Peta Bowden, 
Caring: Gender-sensitive Ethics (London: Routledge, 1997).    
7 The kind of knowledge that Bacon had in mind is scientific, instrumentalist 
knowledge, that is, knowledge of how the natural world works.  Acquisition of 
this kind of knowledge has the aim of conquering and subjugating Nature for the 
purpose of deriving material benefit from "her."  See William Leiss, The 
Domination of Nature (New York: George Braziller, 1972).      
8 In the way I use this word, understanding is a kind of knowledge that is not just 
propositional but is empathic and based in experience.  Understanding is not 
information but empathic knowing gained by "standing under" a situation, 
whether one's own or someone else's.  For the latter, understanding requires an 
imaginative projection of the self into another's frame of experience.       
9 Some sociobiologists are fond of picturing the world as a predatory jungle.  
Everyone competes against everyone else.  Mary Midgely is sharply critical of 
such view, rightly pointing out how competition, while it exists, is a limited 
phenomenon occuring against the immense backdrop of cooperation.  See Mary 
Midgley, "The origin of ethics," in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1995), 3 - 13.  I also attach a comment that the 
word 'jungle' with its Hobbsian connotation of a bloody and nasty place of 
predation is more of our own projection.  "Jungle" is a metaphor for us. 
10 Charles Taylor speaks of the premise that undergirds much of contemporary 
sociopolitical thought, including feminism and multiculturalism: ". . the 
withholding of recognition can be a form of oppression."  Charles Taylor, 
"Politics of recognition," in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutman (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 36. 
11 
                                                 
11 Here I must distinguish the moral sense of respect from the usual evaluative 
sense.  Moral respect is not conditional and its ascription does not depend on our 
evaluation of the merits.  I must treat another person with moral respect 
regardless of his or her moral merits.  But, in common parlance, we often use the 
word respect evaluatively as well: someone deserves my respect because he has 
this and that virtues and moral wisdom.  This evaluative sense of moral respect 
is not what is meant by the notion of respect for person.  The latter notion marks 
the cornerstone of Kant's ethics.  See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the 
metaphysics of morals (trans. H. J. Paton) (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 
1785/1948), 96.     
12 I borrow this term from the Buddhist literature.  In the Theravadan tradition, 
the insight (vipassana) meditation wherein the practitioner engages in attentful 
observation of all that arises in the consciousness is often referred to as the work 
of bare attention.   
13 Nel Noddings' own work, which was referred to previously, employs these 
terms "engrossment" and "motivational displacement." Buddhism uses the term 
"not-self" (anatta), and the contemporary psychologist Csikszentmihalyi speaks of 
"flow" experience.  Mihaly Czikszentmihalyi, The flow experience and its 
significance for human psychology (New York: Basic Books, 1988).  Simon Weil talks 
about suspending our thought, even emptying it, so as to render it receptive to 
the object of our attention.  Simone Weil,Waiting for God (New York: Harper 
Colophon, 1951).  
14 John Ralston Saul, The Doubter's Companion: A Dictionary of Aggressive Common 
Sense (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1995), 94. 
